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Abstract
State Consumer Protection Acts (CPAs) were designed to supplement
the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) mission of protecting consumers
and are often referred to as “Little-FTC Acts.” There is growing concern
that enforcement under these acts is not only qualitatively different than
FTC enforcement but may also be counterproductive for consumers. This
Article examines a sample of CPA claims and compares them to the FTC
standard. It identifies qualitative differences between CPA and FTC claims
by commissioning a “Shadow Federal Trade Commission” of experts in
consumer protection. The study finds that many CPA claims include
conduct that would not be illegal under the FTC standards and most of the
cases with illegal conduct would not warrant FTC enforcement. Even
among CPA cases in which the plaintiff prevailed, nearly half do not
include illegal conduct under the FTC standard and most of the cases with
illegal conduct would not invoke FTC enforcement. The results clearly
suggest private litigation under Little-FTC Acts tends to pursue a different
consumer protection mission than the Bureau of Consumer Protection at
the Federal Trade Commission.
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INTRODUCTION
During the 1960s, there was a perceived increase in demand from the
American public and elected officials for consumer protection legislation.1
In post-World War II America, a perception emerged that markets had
become impersonal2 and that the balance of power between consumers and
merchants in the marketplace had shifted in favor of merchants.3
Regulators viewed increased legal protection for consumers as necessary to
restore the former balance.4 Traditional common law protection was
deemed inadequate.5 State attorneys general attempted to respond to the
1. For example, President John F. Kennedy promoted the consumer protection movement by
defining the consumers’ “bill of rights” in a message to Congress in 1962. JOHN F. KENNEDY,
CONSUMERS’ PROTECTION AND INTEREST PROGRAM, H.R. DOC. NO. 87–364, at 2 (2d Sess. 1962).
2. William A. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REV. 724, 725
(1972); James R. Withrow, Jr., The Inadequacies of Consumer Protection by Administrative Action,
1967 N.Y. ST. B.A. ANTITRUST L. SYMP. 58, 64 (“The difficulties being faced by the consumer today
are best understood in terms of the new ‘impersonality’ of the market place.”); see also NAT’L
ASS’N OF ATT’Y GEN. COMM. ON THE OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN., REPORT ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY
GENERAL 395–96 (1971) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT].
3. H. Peter Norstrand, Treble Damage Actions for Victims of Unfair and Deceptive Trade
Practices: A New Approach, 4 NEW ENG. L. REV. 171, 175 (1969) (“[The] consumer has lost the
leverage he once had in the marketplace. The disgruntled buyer can no longer hash out differences
with his shopkeeper-neighbor; he is now confronted by impersonal bigness where responsibility and
liability forever lie just one department away.”).
4. Brian J. Linn & Gretchen Newman, Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees and Treble Damages—
Balancing the Scales of Consumer Justice, 10 GONZ. L. REV. 593, 597 (1975) (“[T]he goal is to
reestablish equilibrium in the market place by recognizing that traditional remedies for fraud have
proven ineffective in providing the aggrieved consumer adequate relief.”).
5. Common law causes of action—including deceit, misrepresentation, and breach of
warranty—had relatively difficult burdens of proof and limited remedies. See Victor E. Schwartz &
Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1,
6–7 (2005). As a consequence, they were thought to be insufficient to protect the consumer. Id. at 7.
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apparent need for greater consumer protection by using existing statutory
laws, such as lottery laws and printer’s ink laws, to protect consumer
interests. They also advocated broader statutory powers to combat
consumer fraud and other deceptive practices.6 The state legislatures’
responses came in the form of a diverse collection of legislation commonly
called Consumer Protection Acts (CPAs).7
Most CPAs were originally designed to supplement the Federal Trade
Commission’s (FTC) mission of protecting consumers from “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices”8 and are referred to as “Little-FTC Acts.”9 The
FTC Act does not itself provide for private actions, but a primary means of
achieving the CPAs’ consumer protection goal is the private action that
empowered consumer attorneys to act as private attorneys general.10 In
contrast to the FTC, private litigants under CPAs are not limited by
political pressure or public duty.11 Private litigants under CPAs also face
different financial constraints as many CPAs mandate the award of
multiple damages and attorneys’ fees to successful plaintiffs.12 As such,
there may be support for the theory that CPAs do, in fact, fill a gap in
existing consumer protection institutions by allowing private litigants to
bring smaller scale cases where the consumer harm is felt locally or
otherwise escapes the attention of the FTC. These cases may approximate
FTC enforcement actions in terms of the nature and quality of the claims
involved. However, the relatively smaller stakes involved in cases brought
by private litigants may not attract FTC resources or satisfy the FTC
requirement that consumer protection actions be in the public interest.13
For example, to succeed in a tort action for false misrepresentation or deceit, the plaintiff must
prove that there was intent to deceive, which is particularly difficult to do. Id. at 6. Actions in
contract for breach of contract or breach of warranty are seldom more effective than actions in tort
as merchants can make false claims without entering into contracts. Id. at 7.
6. ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 395–96 (noting acts of attorneys general
including using existing laws and proposing new statutory powers).
7. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 15.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
9. See Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts:
Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 438–39 (1991); see also Mark D.
Bauer, The Licensed Professional Exemption in Consumer Protection: At Odds with Antitrust
History and Precedent, 73 TENN. L. REV. 131, 144 (2006).
10. Bauer, supra note 9, at 144.
11. The FTC and private litigants face different incentives and constraints that affect the
nature of actions pursued. Sovern, supra note 9, at 437. For example, the FTC may decline to
pursue an enforcement action that would be pursued by an individual consumer, or class of
consumers, under a CPA. The FTC faces three primary limitations in selecting enforcement actions
that do not constrain the private plaintiff. First, as political appointees, some FTC Commissioners
are bound to be subject to political pressure to pursue or not pursue certain types of actions. Id. at
441. Second, the FTC has limited resources which must be rationed to enforcement actions against
only the most serious improprieties. Id. at 442. Third, the FTC Act itself restricts the FTC to bring
proceedings only when it would be in the public interest. Id.
12. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 3.
13. Marshall A. Leaffer & Michael H. Lipson, Consumer Actions Against Unfair or
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The consumer, on the other hand, is free to pursue any case in which she
might expect to prevail.
State CPAs have become controversial.14 There is growing concern that
CPA enforcement and litigation are not only qualitatively different than
FTC enforcement but also may be counterproductive for consumers.
Critics argue that the combination of private rights of action, generous
remedies, expansive and elusive definitions of illegal conduct, lack of
administrative expertise, and relaxation of common law limitations have
generated a set of incentives that encourages plaintiffs and their attorneys
to file claims of dubious merit.15 Critics suggest that CPAs’ broader
enforcement options place significant strains on the civil justice system
without providing offsetting gains in consumer protection.16 Proponents of
CPAs counter that private rights of action and meaningful remedies are
necessary to supplement FTC enforcement and provide sufficient
incentives for individual plaintiffs to bring suit to deter conduct harmful to
a larger class of consumers.17 While both critics and proponents of CPA
enforcement make claims about the nature and quality of state consumer
protection litigation, it is difficult to compare state CPA litigation to FTC
enforcement.
This Article closely examines a sample of CPA claims and compares
them to the FTC Act standard for unfair and deceptive acts or practices. It
identifies qualitative differences between CPA and FTC claims by
commissioning a “Shadow Federal Trade Commission” of consumer
protection experts. These experts evaluated a sample of CPA claims under
the FTC standard. These two studies generate data that are critical to
informing policy debates on the appropriate role of CPAs in the civil
justice system.
Part I of this Article provides the background and history of CPAs. Part
II describes the data and research methodology for the “Shadow FTC”
study. Part III presents the Shadow FTC results. The basic result is that the
Little-FTC Acts appear to have taken on a much broader consumer
Deceptive Acts or Practices: The Private Use of Federal Trade Commission Jurisprudence, 48
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 554 (1980).
14. Compare Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 5 (recounting history of CPAs,
including California’s where voters restricted their statute because of its perceived use to
“‘shakedown’” small businesses), and Michael S. Greve, Consumer Law, Class Actions, and the
Common Law, 7 CHAP. L. REV. 155, 156 (2004) (arguing that it does not make sense to have CPAs
and common law doctrines “operate on top of each other and over the same range of transactions”),
with Jean Braucher, Deception, Economic Loss and Mass-Market Customers: Consumer Protection
Statues as Persuasive Authority in the Common Law of Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 830–33
(2006) (describing state CPAs as popular).
15. See Henry N. Butler & Jason S. Johnston, Reforming State Consumer Protection
Liability: An Economic Approach, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (2010); see also Schwartz &
Silverman, supra note 5, at 33.
16. See, e.g., Butler & Johnston, supra note 15, at 7–11; Greve, supra note 14, at 174–78;
Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 49–50.
17. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 14, at 832–33.
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protection function than the FTC. Part IV considers the policy implications
of these results.
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS
A. Criticism of Former Methods of Consumer Protection and
the Call for CPAs
The push for states to adopt CPAs appears to have come from the
confluence of three related forces in the late 1960s: criticism of FTC
consumer protection efforts, popular demand for consumer protection and
business regulation, and frustration with common law causes of action.
These three forces touch on each of the existing institutions of consumer
protection: federal regulation, market forces, and state common law.18 It
was the perceived inadequacies of each of these institutions that led states
to enact CPAs.
The FTC was the target of criticism of federal consumer protection. By
1969, denouncement of the FTC had reached its zenith with publication of
critical reports from “Nader’s Raiders,”19 the American Bar Association,20
and Professor Richard Posner.21 This criticism addressed a range of
perceived problems with the FTC,22 including those offered by prior
critics:23 poor leadership,24 insufficient and misallocated resources,25
18. See Timothy J. Muris, The Federal Trade Commission and the Future Development of
U.S. Consumer Protection Policy (Geo. Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Law and Econ. Working Paper
Series No. 04-19, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=545182 (describing the
institutions of consumer protection yet neglecting the role of state consumer protection laws).
19. EDWARD F. COX ET AL., ‘THE NADER REPORT’ ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION vii–xiv
(1969).
20. REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969).
21. Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 47 & n.1
(1969) (listing publications between 1924 and 1969 criticizing the Federal Trade Commission).
Posner was also a member of the ABA Commission that authored the 1969 report. See REPORT OF
THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 20.
22. Posner, supra note 21, at 47 (“The Commission is rudderless; poorly managed and poorly
staffed; obsessed with trivia; politicized; all in all, inefficient and incompetent.”); REPORT OF THE
ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 20, at 1 (“Through lack
of effective direction, the FTC has failed to establish goals and priorities, to provide necessary
guidance to its staff, and to manage the flow of its work in an efficient and expeditious
manner. . . . Through an inadequate system of recruitment and promotion, it has acquired and
elevated to important positions a number of staff members of insufficient competence. The failure
of the FTC to establish and adhere to a system of priorities has caused a misallocation of funds and
personnel to trivial matters rather than to matters of pressing public concern. The primary
responsibility for these failures must rest with the leadership of the Commission.”); COX ET AL.,
supra note 19, at 39 (“1. The FTC has failed to detect violations systematically. 2. The FTC has
failed to establish efficient priorities for its enforcement energy. 3. The FTC has failed to enforce
the powers it has with energy and speed. 4. The FTC has failed to seek sufficient statutory authority
to make its work effective.”).
23. Posner, supra note 21, at 47 (“What is remarkable about these studies, which span a

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 5

168

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

political favoritism and regulatory capture,26 and protection of producers in
the name of consumer protection.27
Proponents of stronger regulation argued that federal regulation and
market forces no longer adequately protected consumers. The increasingly
impersonal nature of transactions in the post-World War II economy had
undercut consumers’ power to protect themselves through market-based
and reputation-based mechanisms.28 Consumer protection advocates also
pointed to the increasing complexity of credit arrangements, marketing
schemes,29 and warranty disclaimers as evidence of the breakdown of the
traditional “arm’s-length bargain” approach to consumer transactions.30
The general perception was that the balance of power between consumers
and merchants in the marketplace had shifted towards merchants, who now
enjoyed disproportionate influence in consumer transactions. It appears
that there was widespread support for greater legal protection for
consumers in order to restore the former balance.31
The final factor leading to the push for states to enact CPAs was the
view that common law causes of action were insufficient to protect the
consumer—particularly because they imposed impractically high
evidentiary burdens in exchange for meager remedies.32 The common law
actions for fraudulent misrepresentation and deceit serve as examples of
the common law’s impracticality in consumer protection cases. These
causes of action required actual injury to mature; this requirement
period of 45 years, is the sameness of their conclusions.”).
24. Id. at 87 (“[T]he Commission today is probably more poorly managed than other federal
agencies.”); REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra
note 20, at 35–36; COX ET AL., supra note 19, at 169–71.
25. REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note
20, at 26–28.
26. COX ET AL., supra note 19, at 130–40.
27. Posner, supra note 21, at 71 (“A perusal of FTC rules and decisions reveals hundreds of
cases in which prohibitory orders have been entered against practices, not involving serious
deception, by which sellers have attempted to market a new, often cheaper, substitute for an existing
product.”).
28. ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 395–96; Lovett, supra note 2, at 725;
Withrow, supra note 2, at 64 (“The difficulties being faced by the consumer today are best
understood in terms of the new ‘impersonality’ of the market place.”).
29. ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 395.
30. Lovett, supra note 2, at 725.
31. Linn & Newman, supra note 4, at 597 (“[T]he goal is to reestablish equilibrium in the
market place by recognizing that traditional remedies for fraud have proven ineffective in providing
the aggrieved consumer adequate relief.”); Norstrand, supra note 3, at 175 (“[The] consumer has
lost the leverage he once had in the marketplace. The disgruntled buyer can no longer hash out
differences with his shopkeeper-neighbor; he is now confronted by impersonal bigness where
responsibility and liability forever lie just one department away.”).
32. Robert H. Quinn, Consumer Protection Comes of Age in Massachusetts, 4 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 71, 72 (1969) (“It was, after all, primarily the failure of the legal system to provide adequate
remedies which led to the great consumer movement of the past decade with the resultant deluge of
new laws.”).
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precluded prospective injunctions against merchants engaging in
potentially deceptive acts. An additional barrier to consumer protection
suits was the requirement that an injured party had the difficult burden of
proving that there was intent to deceive.33 Actions for breach of contract or
warranty were seldom more effective than actions in tort because
merchants could make false claims without entering into contracts.34 Even
where a contract existed, contractual defenses such as reliance and privity
requirements could impede consumer recovery.35 Further, even if the
consumer had a valid claim and could meet the burden of proof, she might
still have chosen to forego pursuit of the claim if it involved a pecuniary
loss that was small relative to the cost of bringing suit.
In the face of FTC criticism, popular demand for increased regulation of
business and frustration with the limits of common law causes of action,
many states adopted consumer protection legislation in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. By 1981, every state had adopted some consumer protection
legislation. Most states have frequently amended their consumer protection
legislation, resulting in great variation between states—even where the
same model act was initially adopted.36
B. Consumer Fraud Acts and Early Model Acts
By 1962, eight states had responded to the call for consumer protection
and passed some act aimed at protecting consumers.37 These early CPAs
generally armed state attorneys general with the power to seek and receive
injunctions against specific practices. One early adopter, New Jersey,
passed a “consumer fraud” statute in 1960 that became the model for
several states’ initial CPAs.38 The act gave the Attorney General broad
powers to investigate alleged unlawful practices, to obtain an injunction
against persons engaging or about to engage in the unlawful practices, and
to seek restitution for those harmed by the prohibited practices.39 While
several states passed similar acts, others, such as Washington, enacted
legislation modeled on the FTC Act and the Clayton Act.40
33. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 7 (noting barriers to common law actions,
including the preclusion of prospective remedies and problems in proving an intent to deceive).
34. Id.
35. Sovern, supra note 9, at 451–52.
36. 1 DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW § 2:10,
app. at 3A (2009).
37. Id. app. at 3A.
38. ch. 39, § 1–12 1960 N.J. Laws 137 (codified as amended at N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 56:8-1 to
56:8-148 (2010)).
39. Id. § 8.
40. Consumer Protection-Unfair Competition and Acts, 1961, ch. 216, § 2, Wash. Sess. 1956
(codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.86.010–19.86.920 (2010)). Section 2 of the
Washington legislation paralleled the FTC Act and read: “Unfair methods of competition and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared
unlawful.” Id.
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Several uniform and model statutes appeared in the late 1960s.41 Many
modern CPA attributes can be traced back to these early model and
uniform statutes. The first of the uniform consumer protection statutes to
appear was the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA), which
was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in 1964 and rewritten in 1966.42 The UDTPA lists twelve
deceptive trade practices, the first eleven of which can be roughly divided
into three categories of prohibited conduct: misleading trade identification,
false advertising, and deceptive advertising.43 The final listed practice was
a general prohibition of “any other conduct which similarly creates a
likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding.”44 The twelve deceptive trade
practices prohibited by the UDTPA, including the final, more general
prohibition of other unfair conduct, were primarily intended to prevent
unfair business competition, not to protect consumers.45
The UDTPA granted a private right of action but limited the remedy to
injunctive relief. The UDTPA did not contain the restrictions of common
law causes of action—neither proof of damages nor intent to deceive were
required to obtain an injunction.46 As amended in 1966, the UDTPA
authorized reasonable attorneys’ fees to be granted to the plaintiff if the
defendant willfully and knowingly engaged in the deceptive practice and to
the defendant if the plaintiff knew his complaint was groundless.47 Most of
the states that initially adopted the UDTPA in some form later amended
their consumer protection law to allow monetary relief to consumers.48
The Model Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law
(UTPCPL) is the model statute most commonly associated with modern
CPA laws.49 Developed by the FTC and adopted by the Committee on
Suggested State Legislation of the Council of State Governments, the
UTPCPL was originally published in 1967, only to be amended in 1969
and again in 1970.50 The UTPCPL was less innovative than
comprehensive. It brought together many elements of prior pieces of
consumer protection legislation and, in doing so, created an attractive
private cause of action.
41. See ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 400.
42. Id.; Bauer, supra note 9, at 145.
43. COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING
IN ITS SEVENTY-THIRD YEAR 253, 258–62 (1964).
44. Id. at 262.
45. See 1 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 36, § 2:10; see also Bauer, supra note 9, at 145.
46. COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, supra note 43, at 262.
47. COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING
IN ITS SEVENTY-FIFTH YEAR 299 (1966).
48. See 1 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 36, § 2:10.
49. Id.
50. ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 399.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss1/5

8

Butler and Wright: Are State Consumer Protection Acts Really Little-FTC Acts?

2011]

CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS

171

The 1970 version of the UTPCPL offered a choice of three forms of
unlawful practices.51 The first alternative form of unlawful practices used
essentially the same language as § 5 of the FTC Act: “Unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.”52 This language has led
many commentators to refer to CPAs in this vein as “Little-FTC Acts.”53
Twenty states initially adopted such acts.54
The second alternative form of unlawful practices prohibited by the
UTPCPL resembled the language of the consumer fraud acts adopted in the
early and mid-1960s by states such as New Jersey.55 This alternative
defined as unlawful “‘false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in
the conduct of any trade or commerce.’”56 This definition does not prohibit
the broad category of “unfair practices.”57 Although a number of states had
adopted similar consumer fraud acts earlier in the 1960s, no state adopted
this language based upon the UTPCPL.58
The third alternative offered by the UTPCPL, known as the “‘laundry
list’ approach,” included the twelve competition-focused prohibitions
enumerated in the UDTPA.59 It added an additional thirteenth provision
focused more directly on consumers.60 This thirteenth provision prohibited
51. 29 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, 1970 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 142 (1969).
52. Id. at 142, 146. The first version of the UTPCPL in 1967 used this language to define the
prohibited acts. 26 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, 1967 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, at A-73
(1966).
53. 1 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 36, § 2:10.
54. Id.
55. See 29 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 51, at 142.
56. Id.
57. See 1 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 36, § 2:10.
58. Id.; see also 29 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 51, at 142.
59. See 29 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 51, at 142; see also 1 PRIDGEN &
ALDERMAN, supra note 36, § 2:10.
60. See 29 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 51, at 142, 146–47 (“The following unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
commerce are hereby declared to be unlawful: (1) passing off goods or services as those of another;
(2) causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval,
or certification of goods or services; (3) causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as
to affiliation, connection, or association with, or certification by, another; (4) using deceptive
representations or designations of geographic origin in connection with goods or services; (5)
representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses,
benefits, or quantities that they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status,
affiliation, or connection that he does not have; (6) representing that goods are original or new if
they are deteriorated, altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, used, or secondhand; (7) representing that
goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular
style or model, if they are of another; (8) disparaging the goods, services, or business of another by
false or misleading representation of fact; (9) advertising goods or services with intent not to sell
than as advertised; (10) advertising goods or services with intent not to supply reasonably
expectable public demand, unless the advertisement discloses a limitation of quantity; (11) making
false or misleading statements of fact concerning the reasons for, existence of, or amounts of price
reductions; (12) engaging in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or
of misunderstanding; or (13) engaging in any act or practice which is unfair or deceptive to the
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any act or practice that was “unfair or deceptive to the consumer.”61
Twenty-six jurisdictions adopted this language.62 Today, most of the states
that had originally adopted the third form no longer rely exclusively on the
laundry list approach; however, five jurisdictions still prohibit only specific
acts without a “catch-all” provision prohibiting unfair and deceptive
practices.63
The UTPCPL gave state attorneys general powers similar to those in
earlier consumer fraud acts.64 Section 5 authorized the Attorney General to
act to enforce the prohibition of acts and practices defined in § 2:
Whenever the attorney general has reason to believe that
any person is using, has used, or is about to use any method,
act or practice declared by Section 2 of this Act to be
unlawful, and that proceedings would be in the public interest,
he may bring an action in the name of the State against such
person to restrain by temporary or permanent injunction the
use of such method, act or practice. . . .65
The attorney general was also entitled to seek relief by restitution or
disgorgement of money or property acquired as a result of any act declared
unlawful by the UTPCPL66 and civil penalties for a knowing violation of
the UTPCPL.67
In addition to attorney general enforcement, the UTPCPL authorized
private actions for monetary damages. Section 8 of the UTPCPL
authorized private suits and class actions for monetary damages as well as
injunctive relief.68 Private individuals could recover the greater of “actual
damages or $200,” with punitive damages and equitable relief available at

consumer.”).
61. Id. at 142.
62. 1 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 36, § 2:10 & n.6 (“Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona,
California, Georgia, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, Virgin Islands, and West Virginia.”).
63. Id. § 2:10 & n.7 (listing Colorado, District of Columbia, Indiana, Mississippi, and New
York as maintaining pure laundry lists approaches). The twenty-one other jurisdictions that use a
laundry list approach also have some general prohibition of unfair and deceptive acts. Id. § 2:10.
64. See 29 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 51, at 145, 150–52. Sections 11 through 14
granted the Attorney General broad investigatory powers, the power to issue subpoenas, and the
power to enforce the investigatory demands. Id. at 150–52.
65. Id. at 147–48.
66. Id. at 148.
67. Id. at 152.
68. Id. at 148–49. Section 8(a) read in part: “Any person who purchases or leases goods or
services primarily for personal, family or household purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable
loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person
of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by Section 2 of this Act, may bring an action . . . .”
Id.
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the court’s discretion.69 Section 8(b) authorized “persons similarly
situated” to bring a class action. Section 8(d) stated that the court “may
award, in addition to the relief provided in this Section, reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs.”70
The UTPCPL consciously attempted not to stray too far from relevant
FTC enforcement standards. Section 3 stated that “due consideration and
great weight shall be given to the interpretations of the Federal Trade
Commission and the federal courts relating to Section 5(a)(1) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act . . . .”71 Further, it empowered the Attorney
General to “make rules and regulations interpreting” the prohibited actions
but that “[s]uch rules and regulations shall not be inconsistent with the
rules, regulations and decisions of the Federal Trade Commission and the
federal courts in interpreting the provisions of Section 5(a)(1) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act . . . .”72 Twenty-eight states currently
reference the FTC in their CPAs.73
C. Comparing Federal and State Consumer Protection
Having been enacted in the face of criticism of the FTC, it is not
surprising that state and federal consumer protection legislation have
noticeable differences. The key differences are that states provide a private
right of action, different remedies, and relaxed common law limitations on
consumer protection actions when compared to FTC policy standards.74
The FTC Act does not include a private enforcement mechanism, yet
every CPA grants consumers a private right of action.75 This difference is
driven by the “balance of power” argument that in interactions between
businesses and consumers, more power must be shifted towards
consumers. This argument suggests that a private remedy for wronged
consumers is necessary for the effective prosecution of consumer
complaints.76 These private rights of action were envisioned as a
complement to public agency administrative enforcement under the FTC
Act. Although public enforcement under the FTC Act requires the
69. Id. at 149.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 147.
72. Id.
73. 1 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 36, app. at 3B. Most states’ statutes provide that the
courts should be guided by FTC interpretations except that such interpretations are not dispositive.
See generally CAROLYN L. CARTER & JONATHAN SHELDON, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., UNFAIR
AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES (7th ed. 2008) (surveying state statutes).
74. Compare 1 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 36, § 2:9, app. at 5A–6A, with 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (2006).
75. See 1 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 36, app. at 5A. Iowa was the last state without a
private right of action but recently enacted one with the Private Right of Action for Consumer Fraud
Act. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 714H.5 (West 2010).
76. See ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 408; see also Norstrand, supra note 3,
at 174–75.
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Commission to consider the public interest in deciding whether to
challenge a practice, only a few states include a public interest requirement
for private actions.77
A second difference between CPAs and FTC consumer protection is
that the statutes confer different remedies.78 Remedies available under the
FTC Act include injunctions, cease and desist orders, consent decrees, and
the disgorgement of profits.79 While at least a dozen CPAs limit plaintiffs
to actual damages, restitution, or equitable relief,80 the majority of statutes
provide additional remedies, including statutory damages, treble damages,
and punitive damages.81 Nearly all states authorize the discretionary award
of attorneys’ fees.82
A third dimension upon which CPAs differ from the FTC Act, and also
from one another, is the degree to which state legislation and judicial
interpretation have relaxed the common law limitations on consumer
77. See, e.g., Hall v. Walter, 969 P.2d 224, 234 (Colo. 1998) (stating that the practice
challenged by an individual under the state’s statute must significantly impact the public as actual
or potential consumers); Zeeman v. Black, 273 S.E.2d 910, 915 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (stating that
unless the defendant’s actions had or has potential harm for the consumer public they are not
directly regulated by Georgia’s respective statute); Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 314 (Minn.
2000) (stating that public interest must be demonstrated to state a claim under the private attorney
general statute); Nelson v. Lusterstone Surfacing Co., 605 N.W.2d 136, 139 (Neb. 2000) (holding
that to be actionable under the CPA the unfair or deceptive act must have impact on the public
interest); Jefferies v. Phillips, 451 S.E.2d 21, 23 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that to be actionable
under that state’s CPA, unfair or deceptive practices must adversely affect the public interest);
Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 533 (Wash. 1986) (en
banc) (stating that private litigant must establish a public interest impact to establish a prima facie
case under the CPA).
78. See Butler & Johnston, supra note 15, at 16–17.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
80. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 22. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-113
(LexisNexis 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.211(2) (West 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-4(b)
(West 2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1213 (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13408 (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.45 (West 2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-15(1)
(LexisNexis 2010); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 59-1609 (West 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-24-31
(West 2010); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (West 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 100.18(11)(b)(2) (West 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-108(b) (West 2010).
81. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 23–24. In some cases, damages are doubled
or trebled regardless of the egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct. E.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN.
§ 45.50.531(a) (West 2010); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(k) (2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48013(a) (West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (West 2010);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.20(5) (West 2010). Nine states provide for treble damages if the defendant
acted intentionally, willfully, knowingly, or in bad faith. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-113(2)(a)(III)
(West 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(c) (West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 93A, § 9(3)
(West 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:10 (West 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10(B)
(West 2010); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(h) (McKinney 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a)
(West 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-109(a)(3) (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-204(A)
(West 2010); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (West 2010).
82. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 25–27.
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protection claims. The common law requirement of reliance is a useful
example. The majority of statutes do not require a CPA plaintiff to show
that he or she relied on the defendant’s allegedly deceptive act or
statement,83 while the FTC requires reasonable reliance in its definitions of
both unfair and deceptive practices.84 Other state courts have held that a
misrepresentation, absent evidence of other harm to the consumer or that
the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation, is sufficient to demonstrate
consumer injury.85 Some state courts have held that defenses such as the
statute of frauds,86 warranty disclaimers,87 the doctrine of substantial
performance,88 the parol evidence rule,89 the common law merger
doctrine,90 contractual limitations on liability or remedies,91 and privity of
contract requirements92 are not available to defendants in consumer
protection cases.
83. Id. at 18–19.
84. Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to John D. Dingell,
Chairman, Comm. on Energy & Commerce (Oct. 14, 1983), available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/addecpet.htm; Letter from Michael Pertschuk, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, and Paul Rand Dixon,
David A. Clanton, Robert Pitofsky, and Patricia P. Bailey, Comm’rs, Fed. Trade Comm., to
Wendell H. Ford, Chairman, Consumer Subcomm. of Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., and
John C. Danforth, Ranking Minority Member, Consumer Subcomm. of Comm. on Commerce, Sci.,
& Transp. (Dec. 17, 1980), available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm.
85. See, e.g., Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 813 N.E.2d 476, 486 (Mass. 2005).
86. See, e.g., McClure v. Duggan, 674 F. Supp. 211, 224 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (holding the
statute of frauds was not applicable under Texas deceptive trade practices act).
87. See, e.g., Attaway v. Tom’s Auto Sales, Inc., 242 S.E.2d 740, 742–43 (Ga. Ct. App.
1978).
88. See, e.g., Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. 1980). The court stated that “[a]
primary purpose of the enactment of the DTPA was to provide consumers a cause of action for
deceptive trade practices without the burden of proof and numerous defenses encountered in a
common law fraud or breach of warranty suit.” Id. at 616.
89. See, e.g., Capp Homes v. Duarte, 617 F.2d 900, 902 n.1 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding that
parol evidence may be used in Massachusetts consumer protection cases); Teague Motor Co. v.
Rowton, 733 P.2d 93, 96 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that parol evidence may be used in Oregon
consumer protection cases); Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985) (holding that
parol evidence may be used in Texas consumer protection cases).
90. See, e.g., Alvarado v. Bolton, 749 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Tex. 1988) (holding that the common
law doctrine of merger is no defense to a claim for breach of express warranty under Texas’s
DTPA); see also Karen S. Guerra, DTPA Precludes Use of Merger Doctrine and Parol Evidence
Rule in Breach of Warranty Suit: Alvarado v. Bolton, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 373, 376–80 (1989).
91. See, e.g., Int’l Nickel Co. v. Trammel Crow Distrib. Corp., 803 F.2d 150, 155–56 (5th
Cir. 1986) (holding contractual limitations inapplicable in suit under Texas “Little-FTC Act”);
Corral v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 732 P.2d 1260, 1271 (Kan. 1987) (holding similarly under
Kansas law); Reliance Universal, Inc. v. Sparks Indus. Servs., Inc., 688 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1985) (holding similarly under Texas law).
92. See, e.g., Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 540–41 (Tex. 1981)
(holding that privity between the plaintiff and defendant is not required under Texas’s DTPA); see
also Lotte D. Bostick, Comment, The DTPA and Privity: Let the Buyer Beware Becomes Let the
Buyer Recover, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 787, 795–96 (1987).
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The CPAs’ attractive private right of action, unlike the FTC standard, is
often divorced from a public interest requirement and from common-law
limitations. These differences have caused some to suggest that CPAs may
be subject to abuse by litigants who have suffered no actual harm and that
this abuse will ultimately harm, rather than protect, consumers.93
D. Expanding and Amending CPAs
Amendments and judicial interpretation of CPAs have tended to expand
rather than contract the rights of consumers.94 Massachusetts’ experience is
representative of the early expansion of CPAs. Massachusetts’ original
CPA gave the Commonwealth’s Attorney General the authority to
investigate and subpoena95 and, in the interest of the public, bring an action
seeking injunctive relief and civil penalties up to $10,000.96 The law
originally did not provide for any type of private action, and aggrieved
consumers could seek recourse only through common law alternatives in
tort or contract.97 In 1969, the CPA was amended to give a private right of
action by adopting language similar to § 8 of the UTPCPL.98 The
amendment allowed consumers to receive the greater of treble damages or
$25 upon proof of injury by an unfair or deceptive practice.99
Amendments to CPAs have often sought to provide adequate incentives
for consumers to act as private enforcers. Proponents of CPAs argued that
if consumers were not willing to litigate and pursue complaints, CPAs
could not fulfill their intended purpose of deterring deceptive and unfair
trade practices. Suits involving common law actions were often
uneconomical for the aggrieved consumer because of high burdens of proof
and the difficulty of establishing damages. CPAs circumvent those issues
by providing causes of action that require less rigorous burdens of proof
than their common law counterparts. For example, the UDTPA stated that
“[p]roof of monetary damage, loss of profits, or intent to deceive is not
required [to receive relief].”100 CPA expansion has also often involved a
reduction in the consumers’ burden of proof.101
These reductions in the burden of proof have been controversial. Some
commentators argued that the presence of a credible threat in the form of a
93. See Butler & Johnston, supra note 15, at 69.
94. However, this is not true for all state statutes. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court has
contracted the geographic scope of its CPA. See Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835
N.E.2d 801, 853 (Ill. 2005) (limiting class actions brought under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act to
fraudulent transactions that occur within Illinois borders).
95. MASS GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 93A, § 6 (1969).
96. Id. § 4.
97. Norstrand, supra note 3, at 173.
98. See ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 408; see also supra note 68.
99. ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 408.
100. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 3(a) (1966).
101. David A. Rice, Exemplary Damages in Private Consumer Actions, 55 IOWA L. REV. 307,
326–28 (1969).
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private right of action with treble damages would be enough to restore the
equilibrium between consumers and merchants, and reductions in the
burden of proof are therefore not necessary.102 Others recognize that CPAs
give rise to the potential for harassment of legitimate business conduct103
and that vague consumer fraud statutes invite the possibility of abuse.104
Amendments to CPAs have also tended to include provisions allowing
class actions. States were slower to adopt class action provisions than
private rights of action in large part because of concerns of abuse. In 1971,
the National Association of Attorneys General recommended that states
empower attorneys general to bring class action suits105 but warned that
allowing private class action suits would “provide[] too great an
opportunity for frivolous suits.”106 Balancing these concerns, some states
adopted the provision of private class action suits along with provisions
intended to make it harder to bring a frivolous class action suit. For
example, Massachusetts attempted to avoid frivolous class actions by
requiring a thirty-day opportunity for the respondent to the potential class
action to make restitution.107 Alaska’s class action provision required a
bond and approval by the attorney general before a class action suit could
be certified.108 The Uniform Consumer Sales Practice Act provided feeshifting in favor of defendants if a class action suit was found to be
groundless.109
E. Modern Concerns Emerge
By the early 1990s, the increasing use of CPAs generated criticism that
CPAs were being used in ways that the legislatures never intended, leading
to substantial abuse and frivolous lawsuits.110 Commentators and experts
began to question whether CPAs were fulfilling their original promise to
supplement public enforcement and enhance consumer outcomes and
whether the courts were interpreting the statutes correctly, especially in the
private litigation context.111 Others argued that the low threshold for unfair
and deceptive acts had gone too far in aiding plaintiffs, encouraging claims
102. Norstrand, supra note 3, at 175 (“Even if rarely invoked, awareness by the consumer that
he need not be helpless when victimized by fraud can only improve the commercial climate. If this
means ‘caveat vendor’, then so be it.”).
103. Lovett, supra note 2, at 744–45.
104. E.g., Rice, supra note 101, at 340.
105. ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 409.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 409–10.
109. Id. at 409.
110. Wayne E. Green, Lawyers Give Deceptive-Trade Statutes New Day in Court, Wider
Interpretations, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 1990, at B1.
111. Perry A. Craft, State Consumer Protection Enforcement: Recent Trends and
Developments, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 997, 997, 1000 (1991) (stating that throughout the 1980s states’
attorneys general were active in enforcement of their states CPAs, without substantial criticism).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 5

178

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

that ultimately were not in the public interest,112 and that the low level of
proof required in a CPA claim made it too easy for an unharmed consumer
to succeed and receive substantial damages.113 In addition, some
commentators have argued that claims were increasingly brought under the
auspices of consumer protection that would have traditionally been brought
as environmental, product liability, or contract claims.114 Recent
commentators have argued that modern CPA liability, characterized by
supra-compensatory remedies and minimal injury requirements, may have
harmful consequences for consumers by taxing socially desirable business
conduct such as communications between merchants and consumers.115
What follows is the first attempt to bring a large-scale, empirical analysis
to bear on these modern concerns.
II. SHADOW FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
Many of the key policy questions involving CPAs require some
comparison of CPA claims to other possible standards for consumer
protection. This section focuses on whether there are important qualitative
differences in claims between those brought in courts and enforcement
actions brought under § 5 of the FTC Act standards by creating an expert
panel to review and apply the FTC standard to a sample of cases litigated
under CPAs. CPA claims are compared to the benchmark established by
the FTC consumer protection standard. Recognizing the differences in
claims brought under federal and state consumer protection authority is an
important first step to understanding the consumer protection litigation
landscape. These possible differences, read in conjunction with the
evidence that litigation activity is highly correlated with CPA statutes that
make lawsuits more attractive to plaintiffs, raise the possibility that claims
brought under CPAs are of a different nature than those enforced by the
FTC.
In order to test whether qualitative differences exist between CPA cases
and those falling under the FTC’s standards for unfair and deceptive
practices, an expert review panel, the Shadow FTC, consisting of five
Shadow Commissioners with substantial consumer protection experience
at or with the FTC, reviewed sets of one page case scenarios of
representative CPA cases. The Shadow FTC panelists answered questions
on whether they believed these cases would likely contain illegal conduct
and, if so, would they likely be enforced under the FTC standard. The
Shadow FTC’s responses allow identification of important differences
112. Sovern, supra note 9, at 437.
113. Jon Mize, Comment, Fencing Off the Path of Least Resistance: Re-Examining the Role of
Little FTC Act Actions in the Law of False Advertising, 72 TENN. L. REV. 653, 653–54 (2005);
Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 3.
114. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 3–4.
115. See Butler & Johnston, supra note 15, at 35–36, 44, 47–51. Actual and potential
defendant merchants may pass the costs of CPA litigation on to consumers through higher prices.
Id.
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between the actual outcomes of the CPA cases used in the review and
likely outcomes under the FTC standard.
A. Shadow FTC Selection
Five individuals with substantial experience at or with the FTC Bureau
of Consumer Protection were invited to serve as Shadow Commissioners.
The Shadow Commissioners include four former directors or deputy
directors of the Bureau of Consumer Protection who are practitioners and
academics with significant expertise on consumer protection issues. The
fifth Shadow Commissioner did not serve at the FTC but had substantial
experience as a practitioner. The Shadow FTC was selected to ensure a
balance in political orientation with two Shadow Commissioners who
served in the FTC during Democratic administrations and two who served
in the FTC during Republican administrations. The fifth Shadow
Commissioner did not serve at the FTC under an administration of either
party and, therefore, is considered unaffiliated.
B. Sample Selection of Cases
A key feature of the Shadow FTC study is the inclusion of litigated
cases that generated substantive decisions under CPAs. The cases were
obtained from a database of approximately 17,000 CPA decisions.116 Three
distinct samples of cases were constructed.
The first sample began with a randomly generated sample of 500
reported CPA decisions from the original population database. From these
500 reported CPA decisions, eighty-six contained case facts sufficient to
develop one-page scenarios, and fifty of these eighty-six were randomly
chosen.
The second sample was drawn from reported CPA decisions in state
appellate courts but not federal district courts because the former were
more likely to have reached final disposition as a “clear win” and less
likely to have remaining appeals. To be clear, this sample is intentionally
biased toward including the strongest CPA claims. For each state, a
specific search string was created that contained that state’s CPA title,
abbreviation, or citation as well as variations on the term “damage
award.”117 These search strings were then applied to each state’s “State
Cases, Combined” database in Lexis from 2000 through 2007. This search
resulted in 3,637 reported CPA decisions. We removed CPA claimant
losses, wins that were subsequently overturned on appeal, and false
positives generated by the search string. We then randomly selected and
created the fifty “clear win” cases.
116. See SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS, AN EMPIRICAL
INVESTIGATION OF PRIVATE LITIGATION (2009) (describing the database), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1708175.
117. The search string used for the term “damage awards” was “damage! w/s award!”.
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The third sample consisted of FTC cases which provide a control
group. Eight decisions were randomly selected, each representing a case
the FTC brought in court containing sufficient case facts.118 Two cases,
which the FTC investigated but ultimately dismissed the complaints, were
separately chosen and added to the second sample.119 The third sample
involves “clear wins” for CPA claimants at the state trial court level on the
CPA claim in which the result was either unchallenged or upheld on
appeal.
C. Case Summaries and Questionnaires
After selecting the three samples of cases, we developed one-page
summaries of the cases and a questionnaire for completion by the Shadow
Commissioners. Party names and identifying case characteristics were
removed so that Shadow Commissioners could not directly identify the
cases. Before distributing the questionnaires to the Shadow
Commissioners, an additional expert in FTC consumer protection actions
who was not a member of the Shadow FTC reviewed the questions and
case scenarios. Based on the reviewer’s feedback, adjustments were made
to the questions and scenarios to ensure that the Shadow Commissioners
could complete the review of all sixty scenarios–from each of the three
samples–in three hours or less. After testing the questionnaire, the
questions in Figure 1 were used for each scenario.120
The survey process took place in two rounds during which the Shadow
Commissioners reviewed 110 one-page case scenarios. After reading the
scenarios, each Shadow Commissioner determined whether he or she
believed the practice was unfair or deceptive according to FTC standards
and whether he or she believed the FTC would initiate an enforcement
action. The Shadow Commissioners were asked to base their answers only
on the information presented in the scenario, their understanding of current
federal consumer protection law, their expertise, and the assumptions that
(1) the FTC has jurisdiction over the entity or entities and (2) the practice
is in or affects interstate or foreign commerce.
118. The set of FTC cases from which we drew the eight was a set of FTC cases captured by
the original over-inclusive search string used to identify cases for the population database. These
cases had been removed from the final population database because they did not include CPA
claims brought by either party in the suit at issue.
119. These two cases were not included in the population database nor randomly chosen as we
had only limited available information on FTC investigations where the Commission ultimately
withdrew the complaint.
120. To limit potential ordering effects, we changed the order of the scenarios three times with
different versions issued randomly to the Shadow Commissioners. We randomized the order by
drawing the sixty numbers three separate times. After the Shadow Commissioners completed the
questionnaires, we collected the responses and informed the Shadow Commissioners of the origin
of the scenarios. We then coded the results of the questionnaire, identifying the Shadow
Commissioners only by a study code number.
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Shadow Commissioners were not told prior to completing each round
that the case scenarios were derived from litigated consumer protection
cases. Further, the Shadow Commissioners did not know the identities of
the other Shadow Commissioners, did not collaborate in answering the
questions, and could not consult any outside sources. The Shadow
Commissioners were not allowed to return to previous scenarios once they
had answered a question. Shadow Commissioners were compensated for
their participation. For an example of scenarios, see Appendices A and B.
Round 1 included the fifty cases from the random sample and the ten
cases from the FTC control sample. The random sample allows inferences
to be drawn concerning the nature of CPA claims distributed throughout
the civil justice system.
Round 2 focused on the “clear wins” discussed above and examined
how a sample of successful CPA claims would fare under the FTC
standard. Each decision in the population database of reported CPA
decisions represents a unique case and was not previously presented to the
Shadow Commissioners in Round 1. The Shadow Commissioners
answered the same questions in three hours or less under the same
parameters as Round 1, with the exception that during Round 2 the
Shadow Commissioners were aware that the case scenarios were derived
from litigated consumer protection cases. The Shadow Commissioners did
not know the cases all represented CPA claimant wins.121
The Shadow FTC review of litigated cases provides the opportunity to
evaluate the distribution of CPA claims currently moving through the civil
justice system. While we do not observe all litigated cases, this study
presents an important first step in collecting and analyzing data relevant to
resolving important policy debates surrounding CPAs and civil justice
reform more generally. Questions 1a and 2a in Figure 1 focus on whether
the Shadow Commissioner believes the available excerpted facts constitute
illegal conduct under the FTC Policy Statements for deception or
unfairness.122 Question 3a goes a step further to ask Shadow
Commissioners whether, relying on their expertise and experience with
FTC consumer protection enforcement, they believe the FTC would initiate
an enforcement action in the particular case.

121. To limit ordering effects, we changed the order of the scenarios three times with different
versions issued randomly to the Shadow Commissioners. We randomized the order by drawing the
fifty numbers three separate times. We then coded the results with the Shadow Commissioners
identified only by a new study code number.
122. Letter from James C. Miller III to John D. Dingell, supra note 84; Letter from Michael
Pertschuk, Paul Rand, David A. Clanton, Robert Pitofsky, and Patricia P. Bailey to Wendell H.
Ford and John C. Danforth, supra note 84.
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FIGURE 1
Q1a. Based on the case facts, do you believe the alleged practice is legally
deceptive under the FTC’s deception policy statement? □ Yes
□ No
Q1b. If no, please identify the legal prerequisite or prerequisites for deception
that are not satisfied.
□ A misrepresentation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the
consumer
□ The consumer’s interpretation or reaction to the misrepresentation,
omission or practice is reasonable under the circumstances
□ The representation, omission or practice must be material
Q2a. Based on the case facts, do you believe the alleged practice is legally
unfair under the FTC’s unfairness policy statement?
□ Yes
□ No
Q2b. If no, please identify the legal prerequisite or prerequisites for
unfairness that are not satisfied.
□ Cause substantial injury
□ Consumer injury not outweighed by offsetting consumer or competitive
benefits
□ Injury could not have been reasonably avoided
Q3a. Based on the facts presented above, do you believe the FTC would initiate a
consumer protection enforcement action?
□ Yes
□ No
Q3b. Briefly explain:
___________________________________________________________________

III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We first consider the Shadow Commission’s view of the illegality of
state CPA claims under the FTC standard. We then consider whether, if the
Shadow Commission considered an activity to be illegal, the Shadow
Commission would pursue an enforcement action against the illegal
activity. Finally, we test the quality of the Shadow FTC’s decision making
against decisions by the actual FTC.
Since the goal of the Shadow FTC was to simulate the hypothetical
actions of the FTC, only aggregate results appear below rather than
individual Shadow Commissioner votes. The results focus on the answers
given by the majority (three or more) of the Shadow Commissioners.
Unanimous votes were common, making up between 24% and 62% of
responses depending on question and round.
Votes in which more than one commissioner disagreed with the
majority were rare. Three-to-two split votes in which three commissioners
voted one way and two the other were few. The large majority of votes
were either 5-0 or 4-1. In Round 1, out of the fifty non-FTC cases, the
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Shadow Commissioners were split thirty times in seventeen case scenarios:
eight times over deceptive conduct, thirteen times over unfair conduct, and
nine times over the likelihood of enforcement. Similarly in the Round 2
scenarios, out of fifty non-FTC cases, the Shadow Commissioners were
split thirty times in nineteen case scenarios: sixteen times over deceptive
conduct, nine times over unfair conduct, and five times over the likelihood
of enforcement. We then examined instances of split voting to identify a
possible bias by political affiliation. It is unlikely that political affiliation
drove split decisions. Of the thirty votes that were split, only seventeen
split in such a way that both Republicans voted in one way, and both
Democrats voted the other.
A. Illegality
A critical empirical challenge in the CPA policy debate is to identify
the quality of CPA claims currently working through the civil justice
system. For Round 1, the Shadow Commission found that most cases did
not meet FTC illegality standards. A majority of Shadow Commissioners
believed that the alleged practice was illegal, either deceptive or unfair
under the relevant FTC Policy Statement, in only eleven out of fifty (22%)
case scenarios.
This result suggests at the very least that the CPA claims litigated in
state and federal courts differ from those involving illegal conduct under
the FTC standard. In other words, a substantial majority of CPA litigation
involves claims consistent with behavior that is likely legal under the FTC
standard. This result is consistent with the concern that CPAs apply more
lenient and plaintiff friendly standards, which lower the quality of a claim
required to justify filing on an expected value basis.
Nonetheless, our Round 1 results should be interpreted with caution.
Other possible explanations exist for the Shadow FTC’s determination that
the CPA claims in our random sample of case scenarios do not violate
federal consumer protection law under FTC standards. One possible
explanation is that the cases’ fact descriptions forming the basis of the
excerpts given to Shadow Commissioners may not have included all of the
facts ultimately relevant to the determination of liability. A second reason
could be that in Round 1, while the Shadow Commission found that three
cases presented illegal actions that the FTC would likely enforce, only two
cases had a clear CPA claimant win at trial.123
In Round 2, the sample of case scenarios involve “clear wins” for CPA
claimants at the state trial court level on the CPA claim where the result
was either unchallenged or upheld on appeal. Again, this is a sample biased
intentionally toward the most successful CPA claims. Our key finding from
Round 2 is that the Shadow Commission believed that there was either
123. The two cases do not include the ongoing cases of Round 1, and they make up only 4.5%
of the forty-four closed cases.
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unfair or deceptive conduct under the FTC standards in thirty-one cases (or
62% of the time). Although all Shadow Commissioners answered the
questions on illegal acts for every scenario, in seven cases the Shadow
Commission had tied answers to the question on enforcement due to nonresponses. Removing those cases, a majority of Shadow Commissioners
believed that there was an unfair or deceptive act pursuant to the FTC
standards in twenty-four out of forty-three cases (55.8%).
The Round 1 and 2 questionnaires were constructed in the same manner
and taken by the same set of Shadow Commissioners at different times.
The differences between the Shadow Commission determinations in
Round 1 and Round 2, when evaluating a random sample of CPA cases
and clear CPA wins respectively, are striking.124 Not surprisingly, the
Shadow FTC was more likely to believe that the scenarios for clear CPA
wins (Round 2) involved illegal conduct than the general CPA cases
(Round 1) as can be seen in Table 1. The difference is significant at the 1%
level.125
TABLE 1
Total Cases
Possible Illegal Conduct
% of Total

Possible FTC Enforcement

Round 1
50

Round 2
50

11
22.0%

31
62.0%

Round 2* FTC Controls
43
10
24
55.8%

6
10
10
12.0%
20.0%
23.3%
54.5%
32.3%
41.7%
* Excludes cases where the enforcement question resulted in a tie vote.
% of Total
% of Possible Illegal Conduct

10
100.0%
10
100.0%
100.0%

Not surprisingly, for successful CPA claims in Round 2, the Shadow
FTC was more likely to find possible illegal conduct than in the
representative sample of cases from Round 1. However, even for Round
2’s successful CPA claims, the Shadow FTC only found possible illegal
conduct in just over one-half of the cases.126
124. Note that the underlying population of cases in Round 2 is a complete subset of the
underlying population of cases in Round 1. As such, there is some overlap that the z-statistics in
this section do not take into account. However, given the positive relationship between CPA cases
that survive to trial and the likelihood that the Shadow Commission believes the conduct was illegal
under the FTC standards and/or that the FTC would initiate an enforcement action, it is likely that
this overlap functionally understates the true difference between clear CPA wins and all other CPA
cases.
125. A two-group test of proportions allows us to reject the null hypothesis that the proportion
of cases where the majority of Shadow Commissioners believed the scenario contained some illegal
conduct under the FTC standards is the same between the two rounds at the 1% level (z = -4.052, p
= 0.000). We get similar results for the non-parametric Spearman rank correlation.
126. One possible concern is that the composition of cases across the rounds differed on some
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It is striking that nineteen of the fifty clear win cases involved activity
that the Shadow FTC would not consider illegal under the FTC standard.
These Type 1 errors—finding innocent parties guilty of wrongdoing—
could represent an important problem with CPAs. More specifically, under
the plausible assumption that the FTC standard with its public interest
requirement is less likely to condemn efficient and pro-competitive
business conduct than the CPA standards, the Round 2 results suggest that
CPA liability may condemn efficient, pro-competitive conduct. Further,
liability for efficient business conduct under CPAs could further harm
consumers through deterring efficient conduct more broadly. These Type 1
errors (“false positives”) in the consumer protection context are likely
greater than the social costs associated with Type 2 errors (“false
negatives”) because the market provides a self-correcting mechanism for
the latter.127 While direct empirical evidence on the social costs of errors is
difficult to obtain, these results raise significant concerns about whether
the unintended consequences of CPA liability outweigh its consumer
protection value, and there is evidence from other settings that liability
prone to significant Type 1 errors can lead to significant consumer
losses.128
B. Enforcement
In both rounds, the Shadow Commission supported enforcement in less
than a quarter of the total scenarios. Of the eleven cases containing illegal
conduct in Round 1, only six would result in FTC enforcement. In Round
dimension other than the disposition of the claim. For example, Round 2 cases did not include
federal district court cases, whereas Round 1 included both federal and state court decisions.
However, if only the state appellate court cases in both rounds are analyzed, there is still a
statistically significant difference at the 5% level. A two-group test of proportions allows us to
reject the null hypothesis that the proportion of cases where the majority of Shadow Commissioners
believed the scenario contained some illegal conduct under the FTC standards is the same between
the two rounds at the 5% level (z = -2.536, p = 0.011). We get similar results for the non-parametric
Spearman rank correlation.
127. For a similar analysis of asymmetrical error costs in the related antitrust context, see
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984).
128. Even though the average price effect of liability costs may be small across industries, in
some sectors it can be quite large. See Tomas J. Philipson & Eric Sun, Is the Food and Drug
Administration Safe and Effective?, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 85, 94–95 (2008) (suggesting that the
deadweight losses to consumers and producers from the price increase due to product liability
litigation in the pharmaceutical industry is in the tens of billions of dollars); Paul Rubin & Joanna
Shepherd, Tort Reform and Accidental Deaths, 50 J.L. & ECON. 221 (2007) (estimating that product
liability has increased accidental deaths by raising the prices of safety-enhancing goods and
services); Richard L. Manning, Changing Rules in Tort Law and the Market for Childhood
Vaccines, 37 J.L. & ECON. 247, 273 (1994) (suggesting that the price of vaccines went up
twentyfold after product liability imposed). For a discussion of these costs in the consumer
protection context related to financial services, see David S. Evans & Joshua D. Wright, The Effect
of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009 on Consumer Credit, 22 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 277 (2010).
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2, there were thirty-one cases of possible illegal activity, but only ten cases
would trigger FTC enforcement. Although the Shadow Commission found
possible illegal conduct in thirty-one Round 2 cases, the Shadow
Commission would recommend enforcement in only ten of those cases.
When we dropped the seven cases with the tied results from the
Shadow FTC from Round 2 but included all non-FTC cases from Round 1,
the Shadow FTC believed that the FTC would initiate an enforcement
action in six of the fifty general CPA cases (or 12%) and in ten of the fortythree clear CPA wins (or 23.3%), which can be seen in Table 1. This
difference is statistically significant only at slightly above the 15% level.129
Thus, focusing exclusively on the clear CPA wins, the Shadow
Commission identified deceptive or unfair conduct under the FTC
standards in over half of the cases. Even in these cases, however, the
Shadow Commission believed that the FTC would only bring enforcement
actions less than a quarter of the time. While for every scenario in which
the Shadow Commission believed the FTC would initiate an enforcement
action the Shadow Commission also believed that either deceptive or
unfair conduct occurred, the reverse is not true. Of the twenty-four cases
where the Shadow Commission thought the scenario indicated some illegal
conduct under the FTC standard, in ten of these cases the Shadow
Commission also thought that the FTC would initiate an enforcement
action. Specifically, the difference in proportions between scenarios
believed to have illegal conduct and those believed would be enforced by
the FTC based on the available case facts is significant at the 1% level.130
These findings could suggest that clear CPA wins may have been
brought under similar standards to the FTC’s but are less likely to be the
type of case enforced by the FTC. As such, there is some support for the
theory that CPAs allow private litigants to bring smaller scale cases that
approximate FTC enforcement actions but might not warrant allocation of
FTC resources.
C. Control Results—FTC Cases
As discussed, ten FTC cases were included in Round 1 but were not
otherwise designated as FTC cases in any way. The FTC litigated eight of
these cases and issued complaints for the remaining two that it ultimately
dismissed. The Shadow Commission agreed in each of the ten cases that
129. A two-group test of proportions only allows us to reject the null hypothesis that the
proportion of cases where the majority of Shadow Commissioners believed the FTC would initiate
an enforcement action based on the available case facts between the two rounds at above the 15%
level (z = -1.434, p = 0.152). We get similar results for the non-parametric Spearman rank
correlation.
130. For the forty-three cases that did not have a tied Shadow Commission, a two-sample test
of proportions allowed us to reject the null hypothesis that the proportions of cases in which the
majority of Shadow Commissioners believe there was illegal conduct and in which the majority of
Shadow Commissioners believed the FTC would initiate an enforcement action were equal at the
1% level (z = 3.088, p = 0.002).
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the scenario described unfair or deceptive conduct. This result suggests that
the Shadow FTC was able to reach the same conclusion as the FTC in
practice. In contrast to these FTC control cases, the Shadow Commission
believed there was possible illegal conduct in only 15.9% or 22% of the
general CPA cases depending on whether ongoing cases are included. The
differences are statistically significant regardless of whether we count
ongoing cases.131 Likewise, in all ten of the FTC cases, a majority of
Shadow Commissioners thought the FTC might initiate an enforcement
action in contrast to the 6.8% or 12% of Round 1 general CPA cases the
Shadow Commissioners agreed might have been enforced (depending on
whether the ongoing cases are dropped). Again, these differences are
statistically significant.132
The Shadow Commission identified similar characteristics in the FTC
and state court scenarios and reached accurate conclusions regarding FTC
action. This gives credence to the Shadow Commission's findings in nonFTC case scenarios. Further, the results may suggest that while the clear
CPA wins are more similar to FTC cases than general CPA claims, even
winning CPA cases are at least somewhat unlike FTC cases. In other
words, the clear CPA wins may have a higher probability of involving
illegal conduct under the FTC standards in the majority of instances but
may not necessarily be cases the FTC is likely to enforce.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This Article set out to study whether state Little-FTC Acts do, in fact,
pursue the same mission as the FTC. This Article has produced a number
of findings that will inform policy debates on CPAs. The Shadow
Commission study demonstrates that there are qualitative differences
between CPA decisions and actions that would likely be found illegal and
enforced under relevant FTC standards. Most CPA claims would not
constitute illegal conduct under FTC consumer protection standards. The
Shadow FTC found that 78% of a sample of CPA claims would not
constitute legally unfair or deceptive conduct under FTC policy statements.
While relatively few CPA claims would constitute illegal conduct under
the FTC standard (22%), even fewer (12%) would result in FTC
enforcement action. Almost 40% of CPA claims where the consumer
plaintiff prevailed at trial would not constitute illegal conduct under FTC
131. A two-group test of proportions allows us to reject the null hypothesis that the proportion
of cases in which the majority of Shadow Commissioners believed the scenarios contained some
illegal conduct is the same between FTC cases and general CPA cases in Round 1 at the 1% level (z
= -4.721, p = 0.000 for all cases and z = -5.168, p = 0.000 for completed cases only). We get similar
results for the non-parametric Spearman rank correlation.
132. A two-group test of proportions allows us to reject the null hypothesis that the proportion
of cases in which the majority of Shadow Commissioners believed the FTC would initiate an
enforcement action based on available case facts is the same between FTC cases and general CPA
cases in Round 1 at the 1% level (z = -5.745, p = 0.000 for all cases and z = -6.221, p = 0.000 for
completed cases only). We get similar results for the non-parametric Spearman rank correlation.
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standards. In a sample of CPA claims in which the consumer plaintiff
prevailed in court, the Shadow FTC found that 38% of these successful
claims would not constitute illegal conduct under the FTC standard.
Although most of these successful cases would meet the FTC illegality
standards, the Shadow survey results suggest that only 23% would likely
be enforced by the FTC.
These findings have important implications for those interested in
discussing and formulating public policy regarding CPAs:
1. To the extent that CPAs are envisioned as complements to
FTC consumer protection, they appear to overshoot the
mark. While resource limitations prevent the FTC from
pursuing enforcement in every case of unfair or deceptive
conduct, this Article suggests that CPAs go well beyond filling
this gap. Instead, CPAs may allow consumers to pursue
different types of claims, including many that do not involve
conduct that would be illegal under FTC standards for
consumer protection.
2. To the extent that the FTC standard meets its goal of an
optimal balance between the public interest and protection
of individual consumers, it is uncertain that the broader
coverage of CPAs benefits consumers. The FTC standard
seeks to limit consumer protection enforcement to those actions
that will serve the public interest generally. CPAs that reach
beyond this optimal enforcement goal may deter businesses
from legitimate activity and force them to focus on legal matters
unrelated to their business goals. Additionally, any increases in
consumer protection that are provided by CPAs must be
considered against the burdens that they impose on the civil
justice system.
The results presented in this Article may inform policy discussions on
CPAs, but the analysis has limitations. The case fact descriptions forming
the basis of the excerpts given to Shadow Commissioners may not have
included all of the facts ultimately relevant to the determination of liability.
Nevertheless, the results clearly suggest that private litigation under LittleFTC Acts tends to pursue a different consumer protection mission than the
Bureau of Consumer Protection at the Federal Trade Commission.
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APPENDIX A: SHADOW FTC SCENARIO EXAMPLE—
ROUND 1
Scenario 1:
Real Estate Agent (REA) buys and resells houses for a profit, and he became interested in
purchasing a house being offered for sale by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD). REA personally inspected the house and decided to make an offer to
purchase it. His initial offer was rejected by HUD in favor of another offer but was placed as a
back-up in the event the contract for sale with the winning bidder did not close. The winning bidder
hired a licensed inspector to examine the house and found evidence of active termites inside the
home, including noticeable holes in the bathroom ceiling and active termites in the baseboards. The
winning bidder terminated the contract, and HUD then asked REA if he was still interested in
purchasing the property. REA personally examined the house again and purchased it stating he did
not see any evidence of termites in the house before he bought it. Shortly after purchasing the
property, REA hired several contractors to make repairs and improvements, intending to place the
house back on the market for sale once the repairs were completed.
Contractor had done remodeling work for REA in the past on a number of different houses, and
was hired to perform general repair work including repainting the interior and exterior walls.
During the course of making repairs, Contractor noticed evidence of active termites. Contractor may
have informed REA about the termites and may have been told to continue his work making
cosmetic repairs. Contractor has also apparently covered over termite damage in other homes for
REA. Contractor went ahead with the repairs as asked by REA.
Buyers became aware of the house being sold by REA through their real estate agent. Buyers
toured the house with his agent and it had been newly painted and carpeted. Buyers made an offer
to purchase the house and, following a series of negotiations, signed an earnest money contract.
On the same day he entered into the earnest money contract, Buyers received a “Seller’s
Disclosure of Property Condition” form signed by REA. REA indicated on the form that he had
no knowledge of any active termites, termite damage, or previous termite treatment. Buyers hired
an inspector to examine the house, and an inspection was performed one month later. This
inspection uncovered active termites on the house’s exterior, as well as evidence of previous
termite treatment along the front porch. REA paid to have a “spot” treatment done for the termites
on the exterior. The sale of the house to Buyers closed in the following month.
A few months later, Buyers discovered a swarm of termites inside their home. They telephoned
REA who referred them to the pest control company that performed the spot treatment before
closing. The company returned to the home and performed another spot treatment. This appeared to
resolve the problem until the following year when termites again swarmed inside the house. This
time Buyers paid for a full treatment by a different pest control company. Buyers also hired a
general contractor to examine the house and estimate the cost of repairing the damage caused by the
termites.
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Q1a. Based on the case facts, do you believe the alleged practice is legally deceptive under the
FTC’s deception policy statement?
□ Yes
□ No
Q1b. If no, please identify the legal prerequisite or prerequisites for deception that are not
satisfied.
□ A misrepresentation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer
□ The consumer’s interpretation or reaction to the misrepresentation, omission or practice
is reasonable under the circumstances
□ The representation, omission or practice must be material
Q2a. Based on the case facts, do you believe the alleged practice is legally unfair under the
FTC’s unfairness policy statement?
□ Yes
□ No
Q2b. If no, please identify the legal prerequisite or prerequisites for unfairness that are not
satisfied.
□ Cause substantial injury
□ Consumer injury not outweighed by offsetting consumer or competitive benefits
□ Injury could not have been reasonably avoided
Q3a. Based on the facts presented above, do you believe the FTC would initiate a consumer
protection enforcement action?
□ Yes
□ No
Q3b. Briefly explain________________________________________________________
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APPENDIX B: SHADOW FTC SCENARIO EXAMPLE—
ROUND 2
Scenario 1:
David D. is a developmentally disabled young man who has been under the legal guardianship
of his parents since he turned eighteen. At the age of twenty-one, David D. was living in his own
apartment, but his parents strictly controlled his finances. They spoke with David D. nearly every
day.
David D. wanted to buy a car but neither of his parents would allow him to do so. They
assumed their word would be final because they did not realize that David D. could obtain any
appreciable amount of money with his debit card. David D. went to Car Dealership, used his debit
card to buy a new car, and received credit for a trade-in on his old car.
Days after David D. bought the car, his mother came to Car Dealership and explained that
David D. was under the legal guardianship of his parents and had no legal authority to enter into a
contract to buy the car. She showed Car Dealership David D.’s guardianship papers and asked to
return the car. Car Dealership would not take back the car saying that the company sold cars to “a
lot of people who aren’t very smart” and that the contract was valid. David D.’s mother insisted that
the contract was void, but Car Dealership handed the keys to David D. who drove off in the new
car.
A few days later, David D. damaged the car in a one-car accident. His parents then managed to
get the car away from David D. and return it to Car Dealership. However, when David D. called
Car Dealership to ask for his trade-in back, someone at Car Dealership told him that he could not
have it but could pick up his new car any time. David D. got a ride to Car Dealership and picked
up the new car. The next day his parents were able to convince David D. to return the car to Car
Dealership yet again, and this time he left the car there.
Several people called Car Dealership on behalf of David D.’s parents including the
investigator for David D.’s guardianship case. Car Dealership was advised that the guardianship
did indeed make the contract legally void but it apparently did not listen to that advice. Car
Dealership did not seek legal advice on the validity of the contract until a month after the sale.
Car Dealership assigned David D.’s loan to a collection agency but never informed it of
David D.’s incapacity. It also demanded storage fees from David D. for keeping the new car on
its lot. It sold David D.’s trade-in on the same day the new car was brought back for the second
time, even though the sale was still being contested.
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Q1a. Based on the case facts, do you believe the alleged practice is legally deceptive under the
FTC’s deception policy statement?
□ Yes
□ No
Q1b. If no, please identify the legal prerequisite or prerequisites for deception that are not
satisfied.
□ A misrepresentation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer
□ The consumer's interpretation or reaction to the misrepresentation, omission or practice
is reasonable under the circumstances
□ The representation, omission or practice must be material
Q2a. Based on the case facts, do you believe the alleged practice is legally unfair under the
FTC’s unfairness policy statement?
□ Yes
□ No
Q2b. If no, please identify the legal prerequisite or prerequisites for unfairness that are not
satisfied.
□ Cause substantial injury
□ Consumer injury not outweighed by offsetting consumer or competitive benefits
□ Injury could not have been reasonably avoided
Q3a. Based on the facts presented above, do you believe the FTC would initiate a consumer
protection enforcement action?
□ Yes
□ No
Q3b. Briefly explain_______________________________________________________
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